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Az alábbi írást egy videó inspirálta. A The Amaizing Atheist youtuber ebben a videóban egy objektív moralitás mellett érvelő videót kritizált. Az kétségtelen, hogy a kritika tárgyát képező képregény nem mutatta be az objektív etika melletti legjobb érveket, viszont a kritika nem feltétlenül jogos.…..
Belépve többet láthatsz. Itt beléphetsz
Olvastad a Beginning of Infinity-t David Deutschtól? A 4. fejezetben "The Reality of Abstarctions" megválaszolja a kérdést. Egy kis ízelítő: ""In the case of moral philosophy, the empiricist and justificationist misconceptions are often expressed in the maxim that ‘you can’t derive
an ought from an is’ (a paraphrase of a remark by the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume). It means that moral theories cannot be
deduced from factual knowledge. This has become conventional wisdom, and has resulted in a kind of dogmatic despair about morality: ‘you
can’t derive an ought from an is, therefore morality cannot be justified by reason’. That leaves only two options: either to embrace unreason
or to try living without ever making a moral judgement. Both are liable to lead to morally wrong choices, just as embracing unreason or
never attempting to explain the physical world leads to factually false theories (and not just ignorance).
Certainly you can’t derive an ought from an is, but you can’t derive a factual theory from an is either. That is not what science does. The
growth of knowledge does not consist of finding ways to justify one’s beliefs. It consists of finding good explanations. And, although factual
evidence and moral maxims are logically independent, factual and moral explanations are not. Thus factual knowledge can be useful in
criticizing moral explanations.
[. . .] The truth has structural unity as well as logical consistency, and I guess that no true
explanation is entirely disconnected from any other. Since the universe is explicable, it must be that morally right values are connected in
this way with true factual theories, and morally wrong values with false theories. Moral philosophy is basically about the problem of what to do next – and, more generally, what sort of life to lead, and what sort of world
to want. [. . .]
. . . there is no avoiding what-to-do-next problems, and, since the distinction between right and wrong appears in our best explanations that
address such problems, we must regard that distinction as real. In other words, there is an objective difference between right and wrong:
those are real attributes of objectives and behaviours. In Chapter 14 I shall argue that the same is true in the field of aesthetics: there is such
a thing as objective beauty.
Beauty, right and wrong, primality, infinite sets – they all exist objectively. But not physically. What does that mean? Certainly they can
affect you – as examples like Hofstadter’s show – but apparently not in the same sense that physical objects do. You cannot trip over one of
them in the street. However, there is less to that distinction than our empiricism-biased common sense assumes. First of all, being affected by
a physical object means that something about the physical object has caused a change, via the laws of physics (or, equivalently, that the laws
of physics have caused a change via that object). But causation and the laws of physics are not themselves physical objects. They are
abstractions, and our knowledge of them comes – just as for all other abstractions – from the fact that our best explanations invoke them.
Progress depends on explanation, and therefore trying to conceive of the world as merely a sequence of events with unexplained regularities
would entail giving up on progress.
This argument that abstractions really exist does not tell us what they exist as – for instance, which of them are purely emergent aspects of
others, and which exist independently of the others. Would the laws of morality still be the same if the laws of physics were different? If they
were such that knowledge could best be obtained by blind obedience to authority, then scientists would have to avoid what we think of as
the values of scientific inquiry in order to make progress. My guess is that morality is more autonomous than that, and so it makes sense to
say that such laws of physics would be immoral, and (as I remarked in Chapter 4) to imagine laws of physics that would be more moral than
the real ones."
lvm
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